April 21, 2026:
The European NATO defensive campaign in the Middle East made clear the inadequacy of its air forces. These were organized around small numbers of manned fighters armed with a few expensive precision-guided missiles. There’s a lot of capability but not much capacity.
Stripped of conventional forces by US and Israeli attacks, Iran is increasingly fighting the war with inexpensive rockets, drones, and mines. These may lack the precision of Western weapons, but can be used in large numbers.
Even while subject to massive air attacks, Iran has managed to launch hundreds of Shahed combat drones at targets throughout the Middle East. A 200kg Shahed can travel more than 1,000 km to deliver a 50-kg warhead, at a cost of about $50,000.
In contrast, a $100m Typhoon fighter’s AIM-120 medium-range air-to-air missiles cost more than a million dollars each, and its AIM-132 short-range air-to-air missiles cost $250,000 each. Even if a Typhoon engages Shaheds with its gun, the cost disparity is remarkable. It costs more than the price of a single Shahed just to fuel up a Eurofighter Typhoon for a three-hour air patrol and maintain it after it lands.
The high cost of European warplanes and munitions diminishes stockpiles. By favoring capability over capacity for both aircraft and munitions, the NATO air forces have steadily diminished in recent decades along with their munition’s supplies.
Iran’s concentration on volume means it was able to continue drone attacks far longer than France and Britain, could maintain its aerial defense against them. Even the US and Israel, with their much bigger air forces and munitions stocks, risk losing a long war of attrition.
Europe must switch to affordable air defenses and do so quickly. It’s a lesson Ukraine learned the hard way as Russia scaled up its deployment of drones, including the Iranian-designed Shaheds, some of which are now built in Russia as Gerans.
Since Ukraine switched to affordable air defenses, other European nations have had sufficient warning that their tiny forces are unprepared for a new era of warfare. They ignored the indications and now have to transform while in combat.
Europe must be prepared to defend against tens of thousands of Shahed combat drone barrages day after day. Given the scale attacks, with Russia launching some 60,000 Shaheds at Ukraine in just four years, manned fighters and surface-to-air missile batteries firing guided missiles are incapable of being the main line of defense.
High-end ground-based air defenses, such as Patriot and SAMP/T missile batteries, are unaffordable and unavailable, and unsuited to the task. Instead, European countries should follow Ukraine’s example and develop layered air defense in which numerous inexpensive drones are an affordable defense. Arab nations in the Persian Gulf have recently made contracts with Ukraine to purchase and set up more of Ukraine’s anti-drone defenses there.
Ukraine’s anti-Shahed system works, and it is common for Ukrainian defenders to take down 90 percent of drones during mass attacks. Ukrainians have efficiently accomplished this once or twice a week, month after month, year after year, while also fending off other aerial attacks. On March 23-24, for example, Russia launched its biggest air attack of the war using 982 missiles and drones. More than 900 of the drones were intercepted.
The Ukrainian system employs wide-area radio jamming that scrambles the satellite communication most Shaheds use for navigation. This costs a few million dollars to protect an entire city for years at a time.
The middle layer is roving aerial patrols, which don’t always involve expensive manned fighters. Instead, they might include helicopters, propeller-driven training planes, or even light cargo aircraft with gunners aiming out of their cockpits or cabins. There are also cheap, fast interceptor drones that range just a few kilometers but strike their targets with enough force to destroy them.
Ground-based gun teams form the innermost layer, taking aim at any drones that get through. The gunners might ride in pickup trucks with heavy machine guns bolted to their beds, or in German-made Gepard tracked gun vehicles first made in the 1960s. It costs a gun team a few hundred dollars in fuel and ammunition to shoot down a Shahed.
NATO countries have come to realize that the drone revolution is real and that NATO nations are unprepared to deal with it. Ukrainian military officials are beginning to change minds in NATO about the drone threat. A growing number of NATO military leaders are realizing that any future Russian attack will overwhelm NATO defenders with millions of drones. Ukraine has manufactured over five million drones since late 2023 and Russia is not far behind. When the Ukraine War ends, NATO nations will be the next Russian target, even if Russia loses in Ukraine.
Since 2022 air, land and naval drones have revolutionized warfare. These systems are evidence that combat robots have become an essential component of the military, without many people in or out of uniform paying a lot of attention. That's still the case, especially because the media and even many senior military and political leaders don’t fully understand the technology or how it is implemented. One example of this confusion can be seen with the constant reference to drones as robots. They are simply remotely controlled aircraft, something that’s been around for over half a century. But these drones are being given more and more operating autonomously robotic capabilities. This isn’t new either, as torpedoes have had this ability for over 60 years and missiles for over 50 years.
Swarms of First Person View or FPV drones revolutionized how wars are fought. There are few methods to defeat drone attacks. The primary defensive measure is electronic jamming of the control signal between the drone operator and the drone. Jamming is of limited effectiveness because active jammers are easy targets for drones programmed to detect, home in on and destroy jammers. Depending on how they are programmed, drones will either land if jammed or return to where they were launched.
Despite those defensive measures, and the small explosive payload drones carry, over half the armored vehicles damaged or destroyed in Ukraine were done in by drones. About 60 percent of all casualties for both sides were inflicted by drones. Drone warfare is dominating the battlefield in Ukraine. Tactics and techniques are also evolving as Ukraine and Russia both experiment with drone designs. Both nations are also increasing production of drones and the number of trained operators. Russia and Ukraine realize that drones provide unprecedented surveillance of the battlefield, but only if you have enough drones and operators. One solution for this shortcoming is operator software that enables one operator to control several drones. The number of drones one operator can handle simultaneously depends on operator experience. That cannot be manufactured but must be developed. Whoever can obtain the most trained operators has an advantage.
All these drone developments make combat far more dangerous for the soldiers on the ground. Drones not only keep an eye on enemy troops but are always ready to go in and put them out of action, as in dead or wounded. Troops are still fighting each other on the ground, but now they have to worry about constant surveillance and attacks from the growing number of drones hovering over the battlefield. In addition to operators there are the drone maintainers, who repair damaged or otherwise disabled drones and service those needing a battery recharge or simply a fresh battery.
Ukraine established a Drone Academy to train drone operators in basic and advanced skills. There are courses for commanders on how best to manage and use drones. This is essential because now Ukrainian infantry battalions have over a hundred drones on their TOE/Tables Of Equipment and access to quick replacement of drones used. Americans call items like drones a force multiplier. This means a battalion with lots of drones is more effective, and lethal, than a battalion without so many drones. The Ukrainian military is the first to go so far in this direction and appear to be benefitting from the massive use of drones. Other nations are closely following this development and preparing to adopt what works for Ukraine. Russia is more conservative in how they deal with this, even though they are also using massive numbers of drones.
There are already dozens of Ukrainian companies offering training for drone operators and the Ukrainian military uses the services of these firms. In 2023 Ukraine sought to have more than 10,000 trained operators as quickly as possible. Drone operators specialize. Most learn to operate quadcopters while a large minority learn how to operate FPV drones, and a smaller number learn how to operate fixed wing drones. Ukraine has found that the most difficult operators to recruit and train are those for FPV drones. The Ukrainian military considers drone operators as a separate military specialty like infantryman, artillerymen, or radar operator.
In early 2024 Ukraine created a new branch of their military, the Unmanned Aircraft, or Drone Force. This is in addition to the Ukrainian Air Force and its manned aircraft. The Drone Force does not control the drones Ukrainian forces use regularly and instead contributes to developing new drone models and organizing mass production for those new models that are successful. Drones have been an unexpected development that had a huge impact on how battles in Ukraine's current war are fought. Drones were successful because they were cheap, easily modified, and expendable.
Early on both Russian and Ukrainian forces were using cheap, at a few hundred dollars each, quadcopter drones controlled by soldiers a kilometer or more away using FPV goggles to see what the day/night video camera on the drone can see. Each of these drones carries half a kilogram of explosives, so it can instantly turn the drone into a flying bomb that can fly into a target and detonate. This was an awesome and debilitating weapon when used in large numbers over the combat zone. If a target isn’t moving or requires more explosive power that the drones can supply, one of the drone operators can call in artillery, rocket, or missile fire, or even an airstrike. Larger, fixed wing drones are used for long range, often over a thousand kilometers, operations against targets deep inside Russia.
Since 2022 the use of drones by both sides has escalated and so far millions of drones have been put to work providing surveillance and attack services for both sides. The Ukrainians consider drones another form of ammunition that is cheaper, smarter and far more effective and lethal than guided missiles or GPS guided artillery shells.
NATO leaders, more than the distant Americans, realize that drones are a major threat. Europeans are developing a joint air defense system that now needs the ability to detect and destroy drones as well as aircraft and ballistic missiles. So many new problems and so far, so few solutions.